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The purpose of Epistemic Authority1 is to defend the rationality of belief 
on authority from the modern assumption that the ultimate authority 
over the self is the self. More specifically, the strategy is to show that 
traditional epistemic authority, including the teaching authority of 
institutions such as the Catholic Church, can be justified even if we 
accept the modern value of autonomy.
The book begins with a brief historical and philosophical investigation 
of the rejection of epistemic authority, particularly as it is arises from the 
ideal of epistemic self-reliance. I argue that although that ideal dominates 
much of contemporary discourse, it cannot be defended from the work 
of Plato, Descartes, Locke, or Kant, and that the epistemological and 
moral arguments for self-reliance are weak. I then turn to an extended 
argument that the conscientiously self-reflective person is committed to 
authority in the realm of belief. I argue that epistemic (and emotional) 
self-trust is both rational and inescapable, that consistent epistemic self-
trust commits us to trust in others, and that some of those others satisfy 
conditions for epistemic authority modelled on Joseph Raz’s well-known 
theses of political authority. I apply epistemic authority to authority in 
communities, defend epistemic authority in the domains of morality 
and religion, and argue that the account of epistemic authority I  give 
shows that epistemic authority is compatible with intellectual autonomy. 
Believing on authority is a demand of conscientious self-governance. It 
is not only compatible with autonomy, but follows from it.
1 Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and 
Autonomy in Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). References to my book will 
be bracketed in the text.
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In this essay I  will give a  summary of each book chapter, and will 
make brief comments on the critical essays most relevant to that chapter. 
For a few essays (Leszczynski, Anderson, and Benton) my comments are 
divided between two chapters. My main purpose is to give a guide to the 
essays in this issue, not to give a full response to each one. The authors 
raise a host of interesting questions on a wide range of topics pertaining 
to epistemic authority, religious authority, trust, and disagreement. I am 
grateful to the authors of these essays and to the editors of EJPR for this 
special issue. I hope that I will be able to have conversations at leisure 
with the authors, and that these essays will stimulate further work on 
epistemic authority.
CHAPTER 1. THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
In this chapter I trace the source of the rejection of epistemic authority 
to the modern rejection of authority in general, which has roots in 
events in the early modern era, as well as philosophical roots in the idea 
of autonomy. My particular interest in this chapter is the tendency to 
identify epistemic autonomy with epistemic self-reliance, which I find 
lacking in both historical accuracy and philosophical justification.
John Cottingham’s beautifully written, generous and insightful essay 
begins with some observations on this chapter. He agrees with me that 
a  defence of epistemic self-reliance cannot be found in Descartes or 
Kant, and I  thank him for pointing out that we get a  strong rejection 
of epistemic self-reliance in Wittgenstein. Cottingham then raises some 
important questions about moral and religious authority. The radical 
historical contingencies of the development of our moral systems ought 
to make us sceptical of the use of our own conscientious reflection in 
judging the trustworthiness of moral and religious authorities, and he 
says that he thinks my project is incomplete unless it moves beyond 
epistemology to metaphysics and gives an  account of moral truth. 
Otherwise, the authorities to whom we refer can easily have sensibilities 
that suffer from the same historical contingencies as our own. I  agree 
that this is a serious danger, but in response, I would say that some of 
the wisest persons who have ever lived, including Jesus, Socrates, and 
the Buddha are still identifiable, and structures have been developed to 
protect their insights from the contingencies of each passing age. My 
account assumes that rationally self-reflective persons can recognize 
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wisdom even when it appears in different historical periods. Traditions 
that developed around these figures preserve wisdom, and operate as 
a counterbalance to the vagaries of cultural change. One of the functions 
of authority in a  religious community is to protect the wisdom of the 
community from changes arising from historical accidents. Of course, 
as long as we are human, we are fallible, but I  do not think we have 
an alternative that is any better than trusting the wisest among us, and 
our ability to identify them. Of course, we are on firmer ground if we 
can rely upon divine providence, but I  was not appealing to divine 
providence for the audience of this book.
I  am grateful to Damian Leszczynski for bringing a  different 
philosophical background to bear on the issues of this book. According 
to my reading of his remarks, his views are much more congenial to 
my theses than he implies, and in any case, he probes some important 
issues of philosophical methodology and the interpretation of Descartes 
that are helpful to an  understanding of the historical background on 
epistemic authority. I  think Leszczynski’s discussion of Descartes aids 
my theses in two ways. First, he agrees with my claim in Chapter One 
that Descartes is not a defender of self-reliance, and second, he argues 
that Descartes is a  defender of self-trust, the importance of which 
I  stress in Chapter Two. Descartes’ grounds for requiring self-trust 
are not the same as the ones I use in the book, but it is valuable to be 
reminded of Descartes’ argument of the need to be certain that God is 
not a deceiver. Both atheists and theists need self-trust, but for different 
reasons. Leszczynski says, ‘I  could have a  real objective knowledge if 
I could correctly apply the method, but the method is reliable only when 
God is not a deceiver and when we were not created by accident.’ Here 
again I think it is useful to consider the audience. What should we say 
to those people who believe we appeared through a purely naturalistic 
mechanism? I am arguing that even if we use a method that is neutral on 
that issue, we get a traditional conclusion about authority by unravelling 
the implications of reflective self-consciousness. I  am afraid, however, 
that there might be a  misunderstanding about the method I  endorse. 
I  do not mean to be appealing to common sense. However, I  assume 
that we have access to the structure of rational consciousness, and that 
it is natural in the sense that we all have it. If the structure of human 
consciousness inevitably leads us to the objective source of our being, so 
much the better for my project.
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CHAPTER 2. EPISTEMIC SELF-TRUST
In this chapter I begin with the reflective self governing itself in such 
a way that it has two aims: to make its psychic states fit their objects, and 
to make its psychic states fit each other. Both of these aims are natural. 
The first aim includes the aim to have true beliefs and fitting emotions. 
The second aim is to have a harmonious self, one without dissonance. 
The problem of epistemic circularity shows us that ultimately, the only 
test that we have succeeded in the first aim is that we have succeeded in 
the second. Since there is no guarantee that we have succeeded in the 
first aim without succeeding in the second, basic trust in our epistemic 
faculties is inescapable. Self-trust is rational because everything we call 
a reason for belief is derivative from what we do when we conscientiously 
reflect with the aims just given. Conscientious self-reflection is the basic 
norm of self-governance. Since self-reflection is natural, being rational is 
doing a better job of what we do naturally.
Pritchard and Ryan ask whether there is empirical evidence for my 
claims that we have natural desires, and that among those desires are 
a desire for truth and a desire for a harmonious self. They are also sceptical 
of the way I connect the natural and the normative. They propose that 
the way we naturally form beliefs and respond to conflicts within the self 
is best explained as part of an evolutionary story, and it would be odd 
if that coincided with the way we ought to behave. It is not part of my 
project to explain how evolution connects our cognitive faculties with 
the way the world is, but that is clearly a problem for others whose work 
I welcome. I do not think that what I am doing in this project awaits the 
outcome of work on the evolutionary theory of the mind.
Pritchard and Ryan then point out that I  have not solved the 
problem of radical scepticism, but have shown that according to the 
view of rationality I  propose, it is less rational to be a  radical sceptic 
than to be self-trusting. I agree with them that that is what I do. I have 
no intention of resolving the sceptical problem, and I agree that what 
makes scepticism so worrisome is that it seems to be the consequence 
of what we do naturally– thoroughly seeking reasons for our beliefs. As 
I say in discussing Alston (p. 41), the person who desires full reflective 
justification for her beliefs and tries to attain it is doing what every 
reflective person does, only more thoroughly and scrupulously. When 
she does so, she finds that she is attempting the impossible. The issue for 
me is what response is most rational, and I give my reasons for thinking 
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the self-trusting stance is the most rational, but I  have no solution to 
the paradox of scepticism, nor to Alston’s paradox of the desire for full 
reflective justification.
Matthew Benton raises a related question in the section of his essay 
on rationality and the resolution of dissonance. I describe the situation 
of the reflective person who becomes aware of the problem of epistemic 
circularity. She trusts her faculties in her pre-reflective state, but when she 
realizes she cannot attain what Alston calls ‘full reflective justification’ for 
her beliefs, she must either achieve a higher level of trust, or she can live 
with the dissonance. I say that roughly, rationality is doing a better job of 
what we do anyway. Benton says he can see why trust after encountering 
the circularity problem is doing what we do anyway, but why isn’t it doing 
a better job if we lose trust, given that we discover upon reflection that 
we lack something we rationally want? Alternatively, we could live with 
the dissonance since, as I point out, we can live with some dissonance. 
Not all dissonance has to be resolved.
I  thank Benton for pushing me in the direction of living with 
dissonance. This is a point I wish I had made in the book. I do not want 
to say that a  rational person must give up the desire for full reflective 
justification. She may not be able to do so. Often desires continue long 
past the time we realize they will never be fulfilled. But the issue for my 
project is what does she do about her pre-reflective trust? She must live 
in a psychic world in which it is impossible to satisfy a certain desire. If 
her psyche depends upon the satisfaction of that desire, then she will 
do what the radical sceptic (allegedly) does, and the structure collapses. 
But reflective trust permits her to continue managing her psyche as she 
always did, but in a more realistic way because now she knows that she 
has a desire for the impossible. But what if she does nothing in response 
to the awareness of circularity? Suppose that nothing changes in her pre-
reflective trust in herself, and nothing changes in her beliefs or desires. 
She does nothing about it at all. She just doesn’t think about it. I think 
that is the person Benton has in mind in one of his remarks. Can she 
live in a permanent state of dissonance without changing anything that 
generates the dissonance? It would be interesting to know whether such 
a thing can happen. I suspect something changes unconsciously. Either 
she gradually and with no conscious awareness becomes a sceptic, or she 
gradually and unconsciously realizes the critical function of self-trust 
in her psyche and it rises to the reflective level. But perhaps not. I don’t 
think I  can say what it is rational to do without knowing more about 
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what people actually do. This is an  interesting possibility and I  thank 
Benton for mentioning it.
Leszczynski also has some interesting comments on dissonance, 
and I like his use of Socrates to illustrate the advantages of experiencing 
dissonance in our psychic states. Because our consciousness is not 
insulated from the world around us, including the social world, we 
cannot get away with living the life of a  coherent paranoid. We must 
continually adjust our conscious states  – beliefs, emotions, etc.  – in 
response to experiences of that world. I agree that dissonance is a good 
thing because it forces us to respond to it by changing something in 
our psychology– a  belief, a  putative memory, an  interpretation of 
an experience, an emotion, and so on, and one of the reasons we need 
self-trust is that we think that in doing so, we are getting closer to 
having a mind whose states fit the world they are about– true beliefs, 
fitting emotions, veridical memories. I think that that is a good way to 
understand what it means to be rational.
CHAPTER 3. EPISTEMIC TRUST IN OTHERS
In this chapter I  argue that consistent epistemic self-trust commits us 
to the same kind of trust in others. Two forms of epistemic egoism 
are incoherent, and we are committed to a  weak form of epistemic 
universalism. The fact that another person has a  certain belief always 
gives me a  prima facie reason to believe it. If another person holds 
a belief conscientiously, I have a stronger prima facie reason to believe it. 
I distinguish two kinds of epistemic reasons: first person or deliberative 
reasons, and third person or theoretical reasons. Trust in self and trust in 
others are deliberative reasons for belief. These reasons do not aggregate 
with third person reasons, or what is often called evidence.
Charity Anderson’s essay is delightfully clear and rewarding to 
read. In her discussion of this chapter she correctly observes that my 
universalist principle is weak. The fact that someone else has a belief p 
always gives me a prima facie reason to believe p, but the reason is not 
decisive and it can be defeated, perhaps even easily defeated. Nonetheless, 
it always has some weight. Anderson worries that the cases in which 
this principle has an effect on our beliefs are few, and that that reduces 
the effectiveness of the argument to oppose the egoist. She makes the 
parallel point about my argument that we owe a higher degree of trust 
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in the faculties of conscientious other persons whose conscientiousness 
we discover by being conscientious ourselves. Most people are not 
conscientious most of the time, and so, she argues, the principle does 
not commit us to very much.
I am neutral on the number of cases in which a universalist would 
believe what some other person believes and an egoist would not. But 
even when the universalist and the egoist coincide in believing or not 
believing some other person, I think that there is a world of difference 
between the person who approaches the epistemic faculties and beliefs of 
others with the attitude ‘Innocent until proven guilty’, and someone who 
approaches other persons with the attitude ‘Demonstrate your innocence’, 
or even worse, ‘Guilty until proven innocent’. The first is like the attitude 
of the epistemic universalist, the second is like that of the standard 
epistemic egoist, and the third is like that of the extreme epistemic egoist. 
I think that universalism not only can make an important difference in 
certain critical cases of belief, but it forces us to become intellectually 
humble. A disposition to see others as basically equal to ourselves, and 
hence partners in the search for truth, can mitigate our natural tendency 
to inflate the self, and to close our mind and heart to the riches of other 
minds and the results of their reflective efforts to get the truth. Anderson 
is right to mention that self-deception can lead us to misjudge our own 
degree of conscientiousness, and I think that the trust in others to which 
our self-reflection leads can also have the effect of making us more 
realistic about our own defects in the use of our powers.
In Chapter Two I argue that ultimately, our only test that a belief is 
true is that it survives future conscientious reflection. That is because 
the problem of epistemic circularity means that we never have a  final 
verdict that a belief is true, and there is always a possible gap between 
our evidence or reasons for belief at any given time and the truth. But we 
think that if a belief is true, it will not be disconfirmed by future evidence. 
Since I argue that many different kinds of psychic states can function as 
deliberative reasons for a belief, ultimately, the only way I have to tell 
that a  belief is true is its survival of my conscientious reflection now 
and into the future when my experiences change, and I have given up 
some of my other beliefs. So the future confirms or disconfirms what 
I believe now. To believe p is to think p is true, and to think p is true is 
to make a bet on our future reasons for belief. I think we make these bets 
all the time. If what I believe now is disconfirmed by future evidence, 
then I will have to change my mind, and there is nothing wrong with 
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that. Change is a  necessary part of the process of making our beliefs 
closer and closer to the truth. But sometimes I can be confident that the 
future will not disconfirm my present beliefs. This is particularly true 
for beliefs that are central to the self, such as moral and religious beliefs, 
and beliefs closely tied to one’s personal commitments. I think that this 
is important for the resolution of disagreement with other persons. I do 
not offer a  formula for resolving disagreement, but stress the fact that 
it is a dilemma that arises within the consciousness of each individual 
conscientious person. Anderson says that we will not always know the 
conscientious way to respond, but that is as it should be if it is resolved 
by a self-directing person. Granted, it is hard to predict what will survive 
our future reflection because we do not know what future experience 
will bring, but to some extent we decide our future self. Each person has 
to decide where she will hold the line – ‘This belief is part of me’ – and 
where she will leave it open that the belief may have to be given up.
CHAPTER 4. TRUST IN EMOTIONS
This chapter gives arguments for trust in emotions parallel to the 
arguments of the previous two chapters. We have the same kind of 
reason for basic trust in our emotion dispositions as we have for basic 
trust in our belief-forming faculties, and we have the same kind of 
commitment to trust in the emotions of others. This makes emotion 
disagreement a problem parallel to the well-known problem of epistemic 
disagreement. Trust in admiration gives us another route to trust in the 
beliefs of others. Intellectual admiration can be a deliberative reason to 
trust the deliverances of the epistemic faculties of admirable persons.
CHAPTER 5. TRUST AND EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
This chapter moves from trust in the beliefs of others based on their 
similarity to ourselves to trust in the beliefs of epistemic superiors, 
persons that we conscientiously judge are more likely to get the truth 
than we are. This leads to a defence of epistemic authority modelled on 
Joseph Raz’s theses of practical authority. The two main theses are the 
Pre-emption thesis and the Normal Justification thesis. The Pre-emption 
thesis is a  thesis about what it means to take someone as an epistemic 
authority. According to that thesis, the fact that the authority has a belief p 
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is a reason for me to believe p that replaces my other reasons relevant to 
believing p and is not simply added to them. Raz’s Normal Justification 
thesis says, roughly, that the normal way to show that A is an authority 
for S is to show that S is more likely to act on his first order reasons if he 
does what A says to do rather than to try to act on those reasons directly. 
I have two Justification of epistemic authority theses that are analogues 
of Raz’s NJ thesis. The first says that the authority of another person’s 
belief for me is justified by my conscientious judgment that I am more 
likely to form a true belief and avoid a false belief if I believe what the 
authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself. The 
second says that the authority of another person’s belief for me is justified 
by my conscientious judgment that I  am more likely to form a  belief 
that survives my conscientious reflection if I believe what the authority 
believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself. I argue that even 
the epistemic egoist should accept the first thesis. When someone else 
satisfies one of these theses, I should take her belief pre-emptively.
I was delighted to read Arnon Keren’s paper on epistemic authority 
and pre-emption since he has already engaged with these issues. Keren 
agrees with my central claims, but argues that there are important 
differences between practical and epistemic authority that damage the 
line I  take in defending the justification of epistemic authority. Keren 
agrees that Raz’s pre-emption thesis applies to epistemic authority, but 
he argues that some of Raz’s other theses of authority do not. Keren 
appeals to our practices of criticism to support the claim he and I share 
that epistemic authority is the power to generate pre-emptive reasons 
for belief, but he strengthens the position by claiming that epistemic 
authority is the normative power to make it a duty for others to believe 
pre-emptively. I prefer to refer to what a rational, self-governing person 
‘should’ do, and do not use the language of duty, but my reasons for not 
speaking of duty have to do with my views about duty in general that 
I do not bring up in the book, and I see no reason to object to Keren’s 
position. If there is any distance between us on this point, I do not think 
it is serious.
Keren does differ from me on Raz’s No Difference thesis. According 
to that thesis, there is nothing that subjects ought to do as the result of 
the exercise of authority which they did not have reason to do anyway. 
The authority’s directive merely gives them new reasons for doing what 
they already had reason to do. Raz argues that the No Difference thesis 
is false for authority in general. Keren argues that the thesis is false for 
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practical authority but true for epistemic authority. I argue that the No 
Difference thesis is false for epistemic authority as well as for practical 
authority. When a practical authority tells me to do X, I have a reason to 
do X that is not simply another reason to do what I already had reason 
to do. Similarly, when an epistemic authority tells me that p, that gives 
me a reason to believe p that is not simply another reason to believe what 
I already had reason to believe. I do not understand Keren’s claim that the 
No Difference thesis applies to epistemic authority because he seems to be 
highlighting a different, but very interesting difference between practical 
and epistemic authority. In the case of epistemic authority, Keren points 
out, the authority cannot give me a reason to believe p unless she has 
one herself. In contrast, a  practical authority can give me a  reason to 
do X when sufficient reasons to do X did not previously exist. Keren 
is right that this is an interesting difference that deserves investigation 
because it applies to the current controversy about the way knowledge 
is transferred via testimony. It is a difference in the conditions for the 
exercise of responsible authority, a difference that applies to the person 
in authority, not to the subject. However, I do not see that it pertains to 
the No Difference thesis.
Keren agrees with me that epistemic authority gives me pre-emptive 
reasons to believe what the authority tells me, but Keren disagrees with 
my defence of pre-emption by referring to Raz’s financial shares argument 
in which Raz argues that unless one pre-empts in taking the authority’s 
advice, one’s track record will be worse overall. Keren points out that in 
the practical case there are only two options: sell the stock or not sell the 
stock, whereas in the epistemic case, there are three options: believe p, 
believe not p, or suspend belief. As long as our epistemic goals include 
both getting truth and avoiding falsehood, he argues, then withholding 
judgment, while not the best outcome, allows us to guarantee an epistemic 
outcome that is second-best. So instead of pre-empting (always believing 
the expert), we are better off in withholding judgment in at least some of 
the cases in which the expert and I disagree. So Keren’s idea is that I have 
to weigh three possible outcomes: (i) believing a truth, which is the best 
outcome, (ii) believing a falsehood, which is the worst outcome, and (iii) 
withholding belief, which means I  might lose the chance for the best 
outcome, but at least I avoid the worst.
I think this is an excellent case for discussion of pre-emption because 
there are a number of different scenarios that deserve discussion. I think 
Keren is right that the subject has three options, and I  thank him for 
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pointing that out, but notice that the authority has three options also. 
So the authority can say ‘Believe p’, ‘Believe not p’, or ‘It’s inconclusive 
whether p, so withhold judgment’. It will still turn out that my track record 
is better if I follow the authority pre-emptively under these conditions. 
That is, I should believe when she says to believe, and withhold when she 
says to withhold. But there are other scenarios that raise William James’ 
famous point in ‘The Will to Believe’ about weighing the value of truth 
against the disvalue of falsehood. For instance, if my hatred of falsehood 
exceeds my love of truth, it would be reasonable for me to withhold belief 
more often than I would otherwise. We must, then, be clear about what 
our first order epistemic ends are.
Benjamin McMyler also pursues the topic of pre-emption in his 
essay, arguing persuasively that authority includes more than the power 
to give pre-emptive reasons, but also includes an essential interpersonal 
dimension. McMyler begins with a worry that the authority of someone 
else’s belief is not strong enough to be parallel to Raz’s view of practical 
authority. The reason is that Raz says that authority is exercised in the 
giving of commands or directives, which means that the parallel exercise 
of epistemic authority is the authority of testimony, which I  discuss 
in Chapter Six, rather than the authority of belief, which I  discuss in 
Chapter Five. I  think that our disagreement here is minimal. I  am 
willing to say that the authority of belief is weaker than the authority of 
testimony, which has the addition of important interpersonal features, 
but there is something interesting about Raz’s Normal Justification thesis 
even if authority is exercised in the intentional issuing of directives. If 
someone knows better than I how to act on my first order reasons, she 
knew it before she told me anything. So her satisfaction of the Normal 
Justification thesis does not require that she testify that p to me, and that 
is why someone’s belief can be authoritative for me, and it is also the 
reason that inanimate objects like GPS systems can be authoritative for 
me. Nonetheless, I agree with McMyler that the interpersonal dimension 
adds something important to authority, something that explains why 
it is stronger than the authority of navigation systems, and why it has 
often raised worries about the compatibility of authority and autonomy. 
When I  obey someone who is authoritative for me, I  am submitting 
to that person. Trust between authority and subject is essential to the 
proper operation of authority. Paradoxically, authority is an  aspect of 
conscientious self-governance because I need others who intentionally 
and effectively help me govern myself according to standards I accept. 
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The conclusion is that McMyler is right that the normative power to 
give others pre-emptive reasons is not sufficient for authority in its most 
interesting sense.
Trent Dougherty defends evidentialism and the Lockean view that 
faith is belief on the evidence of the testimony of an  expert. He says 
that the view that faith is a kind of belief on a kind of evidence is ‘run 
of the mill’. He sees no reason why a subject of authority would take the 
authority’s testimony pre-emptively when she already has reasons that 
bear on the issue. He does not comment on the Razian reason that we 
are more successful at reaching our own ends if we pre-empt. However, 
he says he doubts that it is even possible to pre-empt, and I agree that the 
psychology of pre-emption deserves close investigation. If pre-emption 
is essential to obeying authority, and if it is impossible to pre-empt, it 
would follow that it is impossible to obey authority. If pre-emption is 
not essential to obeying authority, and if the subject merely considers 
the authority’s directive as another piece of evidence, it is hard to see 
how obedience is anything other than doing what a  rational person 
would do in any case. Dougherty says he freely made a vow to obey the 
Church when he was confirmed, but I would like to discuss with him his 
reasons for making the vow since it seems to me likely that he judged 
that the Church satisfies some thesis of the justification of authority 
similar to the ones I propose. (In fact, his reasons were probably more 
reflective than mine were since he was confirmed as an adult, whereas 
I was only twelve).
The main dispute between Dougherty and me, however, is on the 
nature of evidence, and what it means to believe on evidence. He says 
that evidence is anything, broadly construed, that aims at truth. As 
I mentioned above, I argue in Chapter Two that since we have no guarantee 
that anything we call evidence (or reasons for belief) leads us to truth, 
evidence is less basic than self-trust in our epistemic faculties. Nothing 
we call a reason or evidence would be a reason unless it is reasonable 
to trust the connection between the conscientious use of our faculties 
and getting the truth. Self-trust is a reason, and because it is a reason, all 
the other reasons we can identify have the status of being reasons, and 
that includes everything Dougherty calls evidence. The difference is that 
self-trust reveals the first person states that we take to indicate truth in 
addition to propositional evidence. Emotions can be in that category, 
and that is why I say that trust in the emotion of admiration can give 
us another route to the justification of authority. But even if all we are 
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doing is weighing evidence in the Lockean sense, we get an argument 
for the reasonableness of taking certain persons as authoritative on 
the Justification theses. What I  think Dougherty adds is the need to 
distinguish degrees of authority, an  important thing to do when there 
are competing authorities, or when I am not sure whether someone else 
is so much more likely than I am to get the truth in some domain, that 
I should consistently, and for the foreseeable future, take their testimony 
in that domain pre-emptively. But I  think that even though the idea 
of degrees of authority is an  important issue, it overlooks something 
important about authority  – the interpersonal dimension stressed by 
McMyler. For some authorities, I invest myself in them. I do not say, for 
instance, I am 70% sure of you, and only 68% sure of some other religion. 
As Coady argues below, it is hard to say that the authority of the Church 
is all of nothing, but it can’t be a matter of dividing a certain percent of 
my loyalties between one putative authority and another either.
In the second half of Anderson’s paper, she brings up some interesting 
questions about pre-emption. One question that I  find particularly 
fascinating is the question of counterfactual stability. Have I  acted on 
authority if I let the authority’s directive pre-empt my other reasons, but 
I might very easily not have done so? I had not thought of this question 
before and have no immediate answer. If counterfactual stability is not 
necessary, that seems to mean that we can act on authority accidentally. 
But if counterfactual stability is necessary, the conditions for acting on 
authority become very strong, perhaps too strong. I  hope that other 
writers on pre-emption have something to say about this question.
CHAPTER 6. THE AUTHORITY OF TESTIMONY
This chapter gives a parallel justification for the authority of testimony, 
which differs in some interesting ways from the authority of someone 
else’s belief. I defend a view of testimony that is strongly anti-reductionist, 
similar to the views of Moran and McMyler.
In the second section of Matthew Benton’s paper, he brings up a kind 
of ‘authority’ that is possessed by a testifier who knows what she tells me. 
I do not address knowledge or the transfer of knowledge in my book, 
and I do not treat the testifier who knows p as possessing authority in the 
sense I mean. Benton is right that the conditions for successful testimony 
he discusses are third personal, and the pre-emption thesis does not 
apply. But in this chapter I am interested in a subset of testimonial cases 
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that satisfy the justification thesis, and which pose some issues that are 
an extension of the issues discussed for the authority of someone else’s 
belief in the previous chapter. The problem for most of the book is from 
the first-person perspective, although I argue for a third-person version 
briefly. The problem of this chapter therefore has very little in common 
with most of the literature on testimony.
Benton’s discussion of testimony brings up an interesting issue in the 
last section of his paper, in which he discusses testimony as evidence vs. 
the trust model of testimony as applied to religious belief. Readers will 
find a very nice discussion of how we can know that a revelation is from 
God in the first place, prior to the operation of the trust model.
CHAPTER 7. EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY IN COMMUNITIES
Authority is most interesting when it involves networks of people in 
communities with a  structure of authority that serves the purposes of 
the community. This chapter begins with differences between political 
authority and authority in small communities with a high degree of trust. 
These differences permit the justification of a stronger kind of authority 
than we get from Raz’s Justification of Authority principle, and can apply 
to epistemic authority.
The epistemic authority of my community is justified for me by my 
conscientious judgment that if I believe what We believe, the result will 
survive my conscientious self-reflection better than if I try to figure out 
what to believe in a way that is independent of Us.
Tony Coady’s paper is relevant to this chapter, as well as to Chapter 9, 
and I discuss it below.
CHAPTER 8. MORAL AUTHORITY
In this chapter I argue that the justification of epistemic authority applies 
to moral beliefs, whether the authority is an individual or a community. 
Epistemic egoism is very common as applied to moral beliefs, and even 
extreme egoism has a  substantial number of adherents. In fact, it is 
probably the dominant view. I argue in this chapter that moral epistemic 
egoism is incoherent. Taking a moral belief on authority is justified in 
the same way taking non-moral beliefs on authority is justified. Moral 
understanding, in contrast, cannot be attained through the testimony of 
authorities, but even understanding can be aided by other persons.
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Cottingham’s paper, discussed under Chapter One above is relevant 
to this chapter, and Coady’s paper, discussed under Chapter Nine, is also 
relevant to the topic of moral authority.
CHAPTER 9. RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
This chapter argues against religious epistemic egoism, and uses the 
defence of religious epistemic universalism as a way to generate a novel 
form of the consensus gentium argument for theism. I  discuss divine 
testimony and give three models of revelation: the model of chains 
of testimony about an  original experience of the divine, the model of 
recurring first-person experience of the divine, and the ‘high point’ 
model in which a high point of history after an original revelation creates 
a tradition. I conclude with a justification of the religious authority thesis 
which says that the authority of my religious community is justified by 
my conscientious judgment that if I engage in the community, following 
its practical directives and believing its teachings, the result will survive 
my conscientious reflection better than if I try to figure out what to do 
and believe in a way that is independent of Us.
Three essays address issues raised in Chap Nine. John Schwenkler and 
Jacek Wojtysiak discuss models of revelation. C. A. J. Coady discusses 
authority in religious communities. Coady’s comments are also relevant 
to Chapters Seven and Eight.
John Schwenkler discusses two problems I raise for the first model of 
revelation. On the chain model, nobody is as justified in a belief acquired 
through a  chain mechanism than the first person in the chain. The 
farther away we are from the source, the less justified we are. Schwenkler 
quite rightly points out that actual religious traditions always add many 
features to this model that increase the justifiability of the belief: there are 
multiple chains, there is back-tracking and double-checking, convergence 
on a  single person from multiple directions, and most importantly, 
supervision of the entire process. These features bring the model much 
closer to the third model I describe, in which there is a development of 
the tradition over time under the supervision of a  teaching authority. 
But the feature Schwenkler adds that is closest to the high point model 
is what he calls Summation: Each original witness is given only a proper 
part of the message, which is put together when the chains converge. 
The third model I describe is similar to Schwenkler’s up to the point of 
convergence. On my third model, what is transmitted is not an original 
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experience, but an  interpreted body of oral and written traditions 
put together from various sources at a  high point that is thereafter 
transmitted to succeeding generations. The transmission is intended to 
have continuing relevance to future members of the community, and 
with an authoritative method to preserve the high point of the tradition. 
James Kugel argues that Jewish tradition should be understood on this 
model, and I argued that Catholic tradition is also. As Schwenkler points 
out, the chain model does not explain how the transmission of tradition 
is improved, yet we ought to accept its improvement from other sources 
of truth in addition to sacred texts and ancient theological documents.
In another essay on models of revelation, Jacek Wojtysiak plausibly 
argues that the experience model is a refinement and expansion of the 
chain model, and the high point model is also dependent upon the chain 
model since the community’s beliefs need to include a reliable story on 
the initiating event of divine intervention. Furthermore, the concept of 
a high point implies a structure in which the chain is modified to a chain 
of transmission of a way of understanding God. This must involve both 
recalling remote events, and applying the community’s ancient exemplars 
of faith and practice to every believer’s life.
Tony Coady has written a  very sensitive discussion of communal 
authority, particularly in the way it can become corrupted when 
institutionalized. If I understand him, he does not object to my theses 
of epistemic authority as applied to communities, but argues that I apply 
them in a  way that seems to lead to an  ‘all or nothing’ acceptance of 
an  authority, which is unrealistic for an  institution like the Catholic 
Church. My model starts with the authority of an individual, then moves 
to authority in small communities, and I  then apply the model to the 
authority of the Church and other large religious communities that have 
become institutionalized. Groups of people can recognize the same 
authorities, and practical and epistemic authority can often become 
intertwined. Somebody can be better than I am at both determining how 
to reach my practical goals and how to get true beliefs, and there can be 
general agreement about this among a group of people. Rich and varied 
communities can arise in this way. But when the authority gives a large 
number of practical directives as well as testimony to a  large number 
of beliefs, complications are bound to arise, as Coady rightly points 
out. The community might split apart for what seems to us now to be 
a trivial matter (such as the East/West dispute over the filioque clause in 
the Nicene Creed), yet it might not split apart over more serious matters 
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of sexual morality, contraception, and abortion. How can that happen? 
My view is that there is both personal and communal self-reflection, and 
they do not necessarily coincide in their results. I may conscientiously 
come to the conclusion that some particular teaching of my Church 
does not satisfy my conscientious reflection upon my total set of beliefs, 
values, and experiences, and so the Church is not more likely to reach 
the truth about that particular matter than I am myself. But of course, 
if I make such a judgment very often, that will weaken my belief that in 
general the Church is more like to reach the truth (or get a belief that 
will survive my conscientious reflection) than I am myself. So Church 
members may disagree about certain doctrines and still remain members, 
but one of the things they may disagree about is what they need to agree 
about in order to remain members. This is a  problem in ecclesiology. 
Every community has to decide what makes the community what it is, 
and what authority structure preserves it as what it is. The Church has 
a communal set of beliefs, values, historical memories, and goals upon 
which the community continually reflects, and its authority structure is 
one of the things upon which it reflects, sometimes leading to important 
changes, as happened during Vatican II.
Coady rightly notes that I do not discuss institutional authority, and he 
brings up some important problems that arise once a political dimension 
is introduced. He suggests that that can lead to a separation between the 
wisdom dimension of authority and the institutional dimension, where 
the persons with power in the institutional structure are not the wisest 
(or holiest) persons. This is an important point, and I thank Coady for 
pressing me on it. I think that institutional structure is itself justified by 
communal reflection, but when that means that those in power lead the 
reflection, there is a  strong bias in favour of maintaining their power. 
However, there are always voices of wisdom, not the least of which is the 
Pope (and it is interesting that Pope Francis has arranged his life in such 
a way that he cannot be ‘protected’ by those around him from finding out 
what he needs to know, a particular problem for the previous two popes). 
I also think it is important that a community, whether institutionalized 
or not, must not succumb to what I  call communal epistemic egoism 
(Chapter 10, sec. 4), the analogue of personal epistemic egoism, and 
that gives a community the obligation to conscientiously listen to and 
respond to criticism from the outside as well as dissent from within. 
I  think it is also worth noting that the ideal authority structure is not 
necessarily democratic since democratic institutions are subject to the 
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same kinds of corruption lamented by Coady, and in any case, epistemic 
authority by its nature cannot be democratic. I realize that many people 
are mistrustful of institutions in general, but I think that institutions are 
necessary for the perpetuation of moral and religious insights. Coady is 
obviously right that power corrupts, but power serves some important 
human purposes as well.
CHAPTER 10. TRUST AND DISAGREEMENT
This chapter addresses the difficult problem of how to handle conscientious 
disagreement with other persons whom I conscientiously trust. Given that 
trust in others is a commitment of the conscientious self, and given that 
I conscientiously judge that some others are equal or superior to myself 
in their ways of getting the truth, there can be a conflict between a belief 
I conscientiously hold and a conscientious belief held by someone with 
an opposing belief who is at least as trustworthy as myself. Going back 
to the distinction between theoretical and deliberative reasons, I argue 
that the problem is not mysterious if it reduces to a conflict of theoretical 
reasons since there are many cases in which evidence points in conflicting 
directions. The real problem is a conflict among our deliberative reasons, 
which are irreducibly first personal. The problem can only be resolved by 
determining which is most conscientiously trusted. The last section of 
the chapter turns to communal epistemic egoism and the need to resolve 
disagreement between communities in a way parallel to the resolution of 
conflict within the self.
At the beginning of the chapter I  reject two extreme positions on 
this issue – the egoist position that the beliefs of others do not count, 
and the egalitarian position that my reasons for belief count no more 
than the reasons of others. But I also reject compromise positions which 
on many issues can lack the theoretical support of either of the extreme 
positions. I call the disagreement problem an antinomy because I think 
it shares some features of Kant’s antinomies, where the solution is not for 
each side to give a little to the other side, but to change the terms of the 
debate. The outcome may be that one side ‘wins’ in a sense, but not on 
the terms of the original dispute. Joshue Orozco and Nathan King give 
a very helpful summary of the ‘total evidence’ position of Thomas Kelly 
and others, which is a well-motivated middle position that is not a mere 
compromise between extremes, and as they observe, is not far from my 
own view. But since the problem in its strongest form arises from my 
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first-person viewpoint, Orozco and King think that I am closer to the 
egoist position because ‘evidence drops out’ and is replaced by survival 
of conscientious reflection.
At this point in their essay I think that Orozco and King have a mis-
understanding of my view of rationality as survival of future conscientious 
reflection. The norm of reflection is not to believe what my future self will 
believe, but to believe in a way that survives my conscientious reflection 
on into the indefinite future. As I said in discussing Chapter Two and 
Anderson’s essay above (Chapter Three), anything we call reasons for 
belief derive from what we do when we conscientiously reflect with the 
aim of truth, but since there is never a final verdict on whether we have 
been successful in reaching the truth, we aim to believe in a way that 
survives reflection on into the future when we may have more evidence. 
Orozco and King describe a physicist attempting to confirm or disconfirm 
the existence of the Higgs Boson. She conscientiously reflects upon the 
data she has and forms a judgment that it exists. Orozco and King say 
she is rational in her belief and I agree, with one provision. If she has 
reason to believe that the data will differ in the future, she should form 
her judgment provisionally. But of course, she may not know whether or 
not the data will change, in which case her belief that the Higgs Boson 
exists includes a bet that her belief will not be disconfirmed by future 
evidence. As I say above, I think we make these bets all the time. There is 
nothing mysterious about them. But one thing she does not do is to think 
about what her future self will think. I agree with Orozco and King that 
she is not doing that. Furthermore, I say in the book that it is not even 
necessary that she ask herself what will survive her future conscientious 
reflection. It is necessary that she forms her beliefs in a  way that will 
survive reflection, but it is not necessary to ask herself, ‘Will this belief 
survive conscientious reflection?’ She need not raise the second-order 
question about her own level of rationality very often.
CHAPTER 11. AUTONOMY
In the final chapter of the book I argue that conscientious self-reflection 
is the fundamental norm of autonomy. Attacks on self-trust are attacks 
on autonomy. The conscientiously self-reflective person described in this 
book is the autonomous agent. Since conscientious self-reflection shows 
us the rational justification of belief on authority, authority is compatible 
with autonomy and, in fact, authority is entailed by autonomy.
